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Abstract     We investigate to what extent tolerance, as measured by attitudes toward different types of 
neighbors, affects economic growth. Data from the World Values Survey enable us to investigate tolerance–
growth relationships for 54 countries. We provide estimates based on cross-sectional as well as panel-data 
regressions. In addition we test for robustness with respect to model specification and sample composition. 
Unlike previous studies, by Richard Florida and others, we find that tolerance toward homosexuals is negatively 
related to growth. For tolerance toward people of a different race, we do not find robust results, but the sign of 
the estimated coefficients is positive, suggesting that inclusion of people irrespective of race makes good use of 
productive capacity. We propose mechanisms to explain these divergent findings, which clarify why different 
kinds of tolerance may be of different economic importance. 
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1   Introduction 
 
But those values upon which our success depends – hard work and honesty, courage and fair 
play, tolerance and curiosity, loyalty and patriotism – these things are old. These things are true. 
They have been the quiet force of progress throughout our history. … The success of our 
economy has always depended not just on the size of our gross domestic product, but on the 
reach of our prosperity; on our ability to extend opportunity to every willing heart – not out of 
charity, but because it is the surest route to our common good. 
– President Barack Obama, inauguration speech, January 20, 2009 
 
What has made certain countries flourish economically? Episodes in history suggest that an open 
attitude toward minorities of different kinds has played a role. For example, the admittance of Jews 
and other religious minorities into the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Sweden attracted 
productive immigrants and allowed them to participate in the economy, with positive overall effects.
1 
Based on his historical study of technological progress, Mokyr (1990: 12) claims that “innovation 
requires diversity and tolerance”. In line with such historical indications, it has indeed been suggested 
in recent years, most notably by Richard Florida and his co-authors, that tolerance is positively related 
to economic development.  
We follow Florida (2003: 10) in defining tolerance as “openness, inclusiveness, and diversity to 
all ethnicities, races, and walks of life.” On this definition, a tolerant person is characterized by an 
attitude of openness, irrespective of his underlying opinion of those to whom this attitude is extended. 
They may be liked or disliked, approved or disapproved of, loved or hated, it does not matter – a 
tolerant person accepts the presence and participation of all kinds of people in society.
2 While it is 
easy to see how someone would be tolerant toward a group which is liked, why would someone be 
tolerant toward a group he dislikes? Different reasons could be envisaged. Some people regard 
openness as a virtue, period, as part of established norms of behavior. Others embrace openness even 
of those disliked because they consider it beneficial for society or themselves to let everyone be part of 
social life. In any case, it should be noted that tolerance is a multifaceted concept, in that a person can 
be tolerant to different degrees toward different groups of people, and intolerant toward some. 
                                                            
1 See, e.g., Mokyr (1990), Israel (1995) and Grell and Porter (2000). 
2 This is, e.g., in line with the definition of Corneo and Jeanne (2009: 691): “respect for diversity.” We know that 
a common definition of tolerance restricts it to cases where someone has an attitude of openness while disliking, 
disapproving of or hating those to whom this attitude is extended. This implies that people with an attitude of 
openness based on genuine like, approval or love do not count as tolerant. As hopefully made clear, we include 
this group as well in our wider definition, as we are primarily interested in whether certain groups are “allowed 
into” society or not, not what those who do the letting in think privately about those let in. 3 
 
We operationalize this concept of tolerance by making use of replies to a question in the World 
Values Survey (Inglehart et al. 2004), in which respondents in different countries are asked if they 
would like to have homosexuals or people of a different race as their neighbors.
3 The fraction in each 
country that does not answer no is our basic measure of tolerance. We argue that this 
operationalization captures the essence of tolerance as entailing an attitude of openness, of letting 
people in and being included in social – and economic – life. The question is if tolerance, thus 
understood, is related to economic growth – and, not least, if different types of tolerance have different 
effects. 
The modern economic tolerance literature – the approach of which is well summarized in 
Florida (2002a) – tries to answer that question. In so doing, it has almost exclusively made use of data 
from American cities; the dependent variable under study has most often been population or 
employment growth, technological development or income (rather than income growth); and tolerance 
has generally been defined as the share of a population that is gay, bohemian or foreign-born. The 
thesis is that a city with widespread tolerance among its inhabitants will attract people in general and 
creative, productive individuals in particular, with beneficial effects for the economy. While we 
recognize the plausibility of this thesis, we consider the empirical approach – its predominant focus on 
the U.S. and the resulting usage of within-country data, as well as the measure of tolerance and the 
absence of methodic sensitivity analysis – as seriously incomplete. 
Our contribution consists in offering, for the first time, a cross-country analysis of how 
tolerance affects growth, both in a cross-section and a panel. In so doing, we use growth in GDP per 
capita as the dependent variable, which enables us to relate to the empirical growth literature, and 
attitude measures of tolerance. We look at two types of tolerance and thereby recognize that tolerance 
toward one group may yield different economic consequences than tolerance toward another. In 
addition, we apply a sensitivity analysis (by changing the model specification and by performing an 
outlier analysis in the form of least trimmed squares) to see whether the tolerance–growth 
relationships are robust. 
We find a relatively robust negative effect of tolerance toward homosexuals on growth. This 
result is almost without exception statistically significant, both in the cross-sectional regressions and in 
the panel-data analysis, and it withstands our sensitivity tests. The estimated coefficient is quite stable 
and of practical relevance, indicating that an increase in tolerance toward homosexuals of 10 
percentage points entails a decrease in the growth rate by 0.3–0.4 percentage points. These results 
stand in contrast to previous results using American data, which point to a positive effect of tolerance 
                                                            
3 Inglehart and Abramson (1999) and Mellander and Florida (2007) claim that openness toward the gay and 
lesbian population is the best available indicator of tolerant attitudes.  4 
 
toward homosexuals on different types of economic performance. We propose three mechanisms to 
explain the negative relationship: that this type of tolerance scares off or reduces the productivity of 
intolerant but productive and innovative people; that it reduces the average productivity of 
homosexuals by affecting choices of education and occupation and by reducing the felt need to work 
hard to prove one’s worth; and that homosexuals on average have more “postmaterialist”, less strict, 
and less future-oriented values, which will disseminate easier with increased tolerance. 
As for tolerance toward people of a different race, we do not find as robust results. The sign of 
the estimated coefficient is positive throughout, suggesting that inclusion of people into social and 
economic life irrespective of race, releases innovativeness and productive activities. However, this 
result cannot be firmly established with our data, as statistical significance is shaky. 
 
2   Tolerance and growth: previous literature and theoretical preliminaries 
 
2.1   Previous literature 
 
The issue of what causes economic growth stands at the center of much modern economic research. 
Since the early 1990s, the growth literature has taken an empirical turn.
4 As Temple (1999) notes, 
cross-country studies have shown that not only physical capital and labor, as stressed in earlier growth 
theory, matter for how economies develop. Human capital also seems important, as do institutional 
and social factors. For instance, research indicates that the quality of legal institutions is positively 
related to growth.
5 Political institutions, most notably those that define and guarantee civil liberties 
and democracy,  also seem to have bearing on how well the economy functions,
6 as does government 
size.
7 Among social factors, social capital in the form of trust, as well as income inequality, have been 
shown to matter.
8 We suggest that tolerance may be another important social factor.
9  
                                                            
4 Pioneering work has been made by, e.g., Barro (1991), Levine and Renelt (1992), Mankiw et al. (1992) and 
Sala-í-Martin (1997). For reviews see, e.g., Temple (1999) and Bosworth and Collins (2003). 
5 See, e.g., Knack and Keefer (1995), Aron (2000), Glaeser et al. (2004), Rodrik et al. (2004), Acemoglu et al. 
(2005), Berggren and Jordahl (2005) and Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006). 
6 See, e.g., Barro (1996), Aron (2000), Butklewicz and Yanikkaya (2006) and Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 
(2009). 
7 See Bergh and Karlsson (2010) for a presentation of and contribution to this literature. 
8 On trust, see, e.g., Zak and Knack (2001), Beugelsdijk et al. (2004), Berggren et al. (2008) and Dincer and 
Uslaner (2010). On income inequality, see, e.g., Aghion et al. (1999), Barro (2000) and Knowles (2005). For a 
broad analysis of how values, especially those relating to self-expression, relate to economic performance, see 
Inglehart and Welzel (2005). 5 
 
The idea that tolerance is beneficial for technological and economic performance, as well as for 
population growth, has been put forth consistently in the works of Richard Florida and his co-authors. 
Florida (2003: 11) argues that “[p]laces that are open and possess low entry barriers for people gain 
creativity advantage from their ability to attract people from a wide range of backgrounds. All else 
equal, more open and diverse places are likely to attract greater numbers of talented and creative 
people – the sort of people who power innovation and growth.” Florida and Gates (2001: 1) find that  
[t]he leading indicator of a metropolitan area’s high-technology success is a large gay population. … 
Gays not only predict the concentration of high-tech industry, they are also a predictor of its growth. … 
Metropolitan areas with high concentrations of foreign-born residents also rank high as technology 
centers. Overall diversity is a strong indicator of a metropolitan area’s high-technology success.  
Florida (2002b) finds a positive relationship between the share of bohemians in U.S. metropolitan 
areas, on the one hand, and human capital and the concentration of high-technology industries, on the 
other hand. In a study of U.S. regional development, Florida et al. (2008b) find a positive effect of 
tolerance (the share of coupled gays and lesbian of all households plus the share of people in 
bohemian occupations) on human capital and occupational skills, as well as on regional wages (a 
proxy for labor productivity) and income. Florida and Mellander (2010) show that their Bohemian-
Gay Index not only relates positively to housing values, but that it also influences income positively. 
In essence, a line of studies document that tolerance and technological and economic performance 
seem to go together in the U.S. 
There is a closely related literature that extends this perspective to other settings. Florida et al. 
(2008a) look at China and find a positive relationship between tolerance, as measured by the share of 
the population in a region who are from other parts of the country (indicating openness), and GDP per 
capita. Mellander and Florida (2007) report that tolerance, as measured by attitudes toward and rights 
of gays and lesbians, affects the distribution of human capital among Swedish regions, which in turn 
affects regional wages per capita (their dependent variable). Boschma and Fritsch (2007) look at 
employment growth and new-business formation at the regional level in eight European countries, and 
find that human capital as measured by creative occupation is related to these outcome variables and 
that tolerance, as measured by the share of bohemians and the share of foreign-born individuals, in 
turn attracts creative individuals to a region. Marlet and van Woerkens (2005, 2007) find that creative 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
9 Our analysis of tolerance can be related to Buchanan and Tullock (1962), who stress the importance of taking 
the interests of minorities into consideration when designing political institutions. It can also be related to 
Buchanan and Congleton (1997), in focusing on the effects of generality – of having social attitudes of a kind 
that entail treating people equally. Generality, or non-discrimination, can be encompassed in the formal 
institutions, as suggested by Buchanan and Congleton, but could also characterize informal institutions, as in this 
study. 6 
 
individuals, who are important for urban employment growth across Dutch cities, are not primarily 
attracted by tolerance (measured by the average of the shares of people who subscribed to two gay 
magazines and belonged to the national gay political organization, the share of bohemians and ethnic 
diversity) but by job opportunities and amenities. Ottaviano and Peri (2006) show that there is a 
positive relationship between the share of foreign-born residents in U.S. cities and subsequent wage 
and rent increases for U.S.-born citizens. Again, these studies, with two exceptions, lend some support 
to the idea of a beneficial link between tolerance and certain economic variables. Hence, the effect 
does not seem to be U.S.-specific. However, these studies are all limited to specific countries or 
regions, and the measures of tolerance used are not, in our view, particularly apt (see section 3). 
There are other studies that rather find that education, and the higher productivity that it gives 
rise is to, are central for population and productivity growth in U.S. cities, hence implying that 
tolerance and an ability to attract creative individuals are not that central – see Glaeser et al. (1995), 
Glaeser and Saiz (2004), Glaeser (2005) and Shapiro (2006). As tolerance may be a byproduct of 
education, failing to control for human capital may result in severely misleading conclusions about the 
role of tolerance. However, McGranahan and Wojan (2007) confirm the Florida thesis that creative 
occupations exert an independent and larger effect on employment growth, compared to human 
capital.  
On the basis of the current state of the literature, we believe that our study offers valuable 
complementary knowledge about the tolerance–growth relationship. 
 
2.2   Theoretical preliminaries 
 
Oftentimes, tolerance is portrayed as a social attitude with solely beneficial effects. As described in 
section 2.1, Richard Florida and others stress that tolerance spurs creativity and innovation. Of central 
importance for this process to work is an openness to change – to the introduction of new 
combinations and creative destruction (to use Schumpeter’s phrases). North (1990: 80–81) locates the 
determinants of openness to change and adaptation in both formal and informal institutions. That is: 
new ideas must be legally permitted to emerge and be put to use, and norms, traditions, and attitudes 
must likewise accept that old ways of doing things are replaced with new ones. Tolerance, the 
previous literature suggests, constitutes an openness of this kind. While we acknowledge that tolerance 
can stimulate economic growth in this way, in line with endogenous growth theory (Romer 1986, 
1990), we think that tolerance sometimes could have negative effects, which is overlooked in the 
literature.  7 
 
We suggest that tolerance can affect economic growth in three basic ways. First, by affecting 
others than those toward which tolerance is directed. Second, by affecting the productivity and 
innovative capacity of the minority groups that become tolerated. Third, by affecting the generation 
and spread of new ideas and values. In the following, we discuss mechanisms through which these 
effects can be positive or negative, with an emphasis on differences between tolerance toward 
homosexuals and tolerance toward people of a different race in this regard. 
 
2.2.1   Effects on others 
 
Suppose that productive people are attracted to tolerant environments. Then tolerance can increase the 
efficient allocation of labor and talent both between and within countries, as it entails what Florida and 
Gates (2001: 2) call low barriers to entry for human capital. This, then, is a mechanism through which 
tolerance affects growth positively. Suppose, in contrast, that the talented, productive and innovate 
people overall dislike the acceptance of all people and lifestyles. Conservative or intolerant groups 
may be important even in societies that are overall characterized as tolerant. Then a negative growth 
effect could ensue, if tolerance scares off or reduces the productivity and innovativeness of these 
people. If, say, a country or area is very tolerant toward homosexuals, then conservative people may 
decide to not move there, and to the extent that they would have contributed to higher growth by 
working hard and applying their skills and talents, their not coming represents foregone growth 
opportunities. Furthermore, the productivity of the intolerant in a given area or country could be 
affected by the general tolerance extended to certain minority groups. Racists or those with sexual 
prejudice can feel uncomfortable in workplaces where minorities they dislike, and their lifestyles, are 
welcomed. Consequently, they can self-select away from the most productive jobs available to them if 
those jobs are part of a setting which welcomes such minorities. Whether the growth effect of 
tolerance is positive or negative therefore at least partly depends on whether the productive and 
innovative welcome or dislike the acceptance of all people and lifestyles.  
We argue that a negative growth effect is more probable with regard to tolerance toward 
homosexuals. If productive and innovative people are sexually prejudiced, tolerance could deter them 
from moving into an area or country, it could encourage them to move elsewhere and it could reduce 
their productivity if they stay put.
10 If they value traditional family life, it could be unpleasant to live 
                                                            
10 Following Herek (2000), we use the term “sexual prejudice” to denote negative attitudes toward an individual 
because of his or her sexual orientation, in this case homosexuality. 8 
 
in a society in which a gay lifestyle is openly acknowledged and respected.
11 Even though one’s sexual 
orientation can be hidden (unlike race), in tolerant societies there is little incentive to do so, which 
exacerbates this effect. In contrast, tolerance toward people of another race can be expected to attract 
new and productive people to an area or a country, especially foreigners, as they are often of another 
race and since, in any case, the correlation between tolerance toward people of a different race and 
tolerance toward immigrants is high (0.85, based on data from Inglehart et al. 2004).  
Furthermore, for the sexually prejudiced people who remain in a given, generally tolerant place, 
they can be expected to be affected by the presence of homosexuals in the workplace, which makes 
them spend time and energy on matters unrelated to productive activities.
12 They can also self-select 
away from professions or workplaces where homosexuals are visible, which means that they impose a 
constraint on themselves which in some cases entails not taking a job at which their productivity could 
be put to the best use. 
 
2.2.2   Effects on the tolerated groups 
 
Consider first two mechanisms through which tolerance can increase growth: by attracting innovative 
and productive minority-group members from other countries and by affecting the allocation of labor 
and talent within a country. As for the latter mechanism, if employers solely care about the  
productivity of potential employees and do not much care about  characteristics unrelated to 
productivity, then it is more probable that people are allocated to positions to which their talent is put 
to best use. This implies a link between tolerance and discrimination (in the sense of Becker 1971), 
such that where the former is in place, the latter is less prevalent. But consider also that there are two 
mechanisms through which tolerance can decrease growth: it can attract low-productive minority-
group members from other countries and areas, and it can make a group toward which tolerance is 
extended less productive to the extent that non-innovative or unproductive choices are encouraged (or 
at least not discouraged) through tolerant attitudes. Whether the growth effect of tolerance is positive 
or negative therefore at least partly depends on how productive those toward whom tolerance is 
extended are and how their productivity changes with tolerance. 
                                                            
11 Corneo and Jeanne (2009) find that being married is a predictor of finding homosexuality not justifiable. 
Furthermore, Stratton (2007) finds that married men are more productive than unmarried men. Together, these 
two finding provide some support for sexually prejudiced persons being high-productive.  
12 See, e.g., Embrick et al. (2007) on working class masculinity and its relations to attitudes toward homosexuals 
in the workplace. 9 
 
We suggest that a negative growth effect is more probable in the case of tolerance toward 
homosexuals, which can make homosexuals less productive on average, in two ways. On the one 
hand, homosexuality can be hidden, and it could be that in an intolerant society, homosexuals to a 
large extent lead “heterosexual” lives, marrying someone of the opposite sex and having children – 
and therefore, they are similar to others in the labor market.
13 When tolerance rises, the need to adapt 
socially is reduced, which leads them not to marry and have children, which may make them take a 
less long-term view (involving less care for long-term investments of a physical, monetary and 
human-capital kind), and to satisfy a preference for certain kinds of low-productive jobs.
14 There is, as 
far as we can see, no corresponding mechanism based on race. 
On the other hand, tolerance can make homosexuals feel a reduced psychological need to prove 
their worth in society, which can cause a reduced propensity to acquire an education and to work hard. 
In contrast, this mechanism does not apply very well to people of a different race. Whereas 
homosexuals can hide their orientation in an intolerant society, race cannot easily be hidden. This 
implies that even if people of a different race work hard, they will still probably be discriminated 
against in an intolerant society, which means that they will not be able to prove their worth in practice 
although they feel a need to do so. In the case of homosexuals then, there is a clear difference between 
an intolerant and tolerant society: in the former, they can work hard and hide their orientation; in the 
latter, they feel a reduced need to prove to others that they are productive. In the case of people of a 
different race, they can wish to work hard in an intolerant society but will be stopped anyway because 
of racist attitudes. In the tolerant society, the need to prove one’s worth is small also for them, but the 






13 See, e.g., Ross (1989). 
14 Ahmed and Hammarstedt (forthcoming) find that homosexual males have a lower average income than 
heterosexual males. According to Plug and Berkhout (2008), such a difference primarily results from a selection 
effect where a certain segment of homosexual workers concentrate in lower-paid (and plausibly less productive) 
occupations. Antecol et al. (2008) find that it has to do with differences in human-capital accumulation, which is 
also relevant for growth. Black et al. (2007) suggest the following: “Applying the theory of household 
specialization to gay men, we might expect that gays who realize early in life that they are unlikely to form 
traditional households with children may plan on specializing less intensely in market production than 
heterosexual men. These realizations would create differences by sexual orientation in educational choices, 
occupational choices, and other labor market decisions.”  10 
 
2.2.3   New ideas 
 
Perhaps the most important effect of tolerance is its dynamic effects on the generation and spread of 
new ideas. On the positive side, tolerance can be seen as an indication of a broader outlook on life and 
on openness toward that which is unknown or untried at present, which implies an openness to new 
ideas and entrepreneurship.
15 The idea is that a society which allows everyone to contribute to the 
generation of new knowledge, be it as employees, employers or entrepreneurs, can grow at a faster 
pace than a society in which the new knowledge of certain groups of people is not listened to.
16 
However, there is a negative side as well. The ideas that are generated and spread in a tolerant climate 
need not be growth-enhancing. For growth to ensue from openness to ideas, there is a need for a well-
functioning selection mechanism, which filters out ideas that are not relevant or good for growth. 
Oftentimes, we suggest, such a mechanism is not in place. In particular, tolerance toward a group with 
values that are not conducive to productive and innovative activity may lead to the dissemination of 
those values into the wider population as the tolerated group takes a more prominent place in society, 
with negative growth effects. Whether the growth effect of tolerance is positive or negative therefore 
at least partly depends on the content and character of the most influential ideas that are generated and 
spread in an open climate. 
Also here we think that a negative growth effect is more probable with regard to tolerance 
toward homosexuals. Homosexuals to a larger degree advocate a more postmaterialst, a more leisure-
oriented, less strict and less long-term way of life (with less weight to long-term investment), plausibly 
both because they personally benefit from a socially liberal society and because they generally do not 
have children.
17 This should have economic consequences, in terms of work ethic, rule-following and 
willingness to save and invest for the long term. In contrast, there is no reason to expect people of a 
different race to embrace such a perspective, both because stricter values are prevalent among many 
                                                            
15 A negative link between the personality trait “openness to experience” and prejudice is shown to exist by, e.g., 
Ekehammar and Akrami (2003) and Barron et al. (2008). On tolerance, diversity and creativity, see, e.g., 
Sternberg (1999) and Page (2007). The link between entrepreneurship and economic growth is well documented: 
see, e.g., Nyström (2009).   
16 This relates to what Granovetter (1983) calls “the strength of weak ties”, i.e., the idea that it is beneficial for 
the generation, spread and use of knowledge in society if people are open to ties not only with people of their 
own kind but also with people that are different and with whom they are only loosely related. 
17 Inglehart and Abramson (1999) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005) describe the broad value shifts in many 
countries in recent years, toward a more individualistic and self-realizing ideal, away from a more self-denialist 
and duty-bound position. This “social liberal” shift seems to have been adapted to a higher degree by 
homosexuals – see Egan et al. (2009). 11 
 
minority race groups and because they typically have children, which induce them to take a 
cautionary-conservative and long-term perspective. 
 
2.2.5   Summary 
 
Tolerance can have both positive and negative effects on economic growth – by affecting productive 
and innovate people outside of the tolerated groups, by affecting members of the tolerated groups and 
by affecting the generation and spread of ideas and values. The theoretical mechanisms outlined in this 
section should be seen as elaborative and as potentially able to explain the tolerance–growth 
relationships. It may be that not all of the proposed mechanisms are at work or, to the extent that they 
are, that the effects are small. However, we would argue that they are all potentially valid and that 
they, taken together, offer an explanation of a substantial effect of tolerance on growth. As for the 
signs, we suggest that there are stronger reasons to expect negative growth effects for tolerance toward 
homosexuals than for tolerance toward people of a different race.
18 However, if these negative effects 
dominate the positive ones is an empirical question, which we will now address. 
 
3   Empirical approach and data 
 
3.1   Empirical approach 
 
Unlike the previous literature, we investigate the relationship between tolerance and growth in a cross-
country setting. This approach can be motivated as a valuable complement to see if previously 
documented relationships hold for a larger selection of countries.  
First, we follow the standard approach in the empirical growth literature and estimate a model 
of the following kind: 
ΔYi = α + XiΓ + Fiβ + ui,     (1) 
where ΔYi denotes the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita, where Xi is a row vector of 
tolerance measures and where Fi is a row vector of control variables.  
                                                            
18 By focusing here on negative effects, we do not want to give the impression that the reasoning applies to all or 
most homosexuals (we are concerned with aggregates and averages), nor do we want to give the impression that 
tolerance toward homosexuals is a bad thing. The purpose of our reasoning is not intended to be normative.” 12 
 
The model is estimated in a baseline specification with Xi consisting of two tolerance measures: 
tolerance toward people of a different race and tolerance toward homosexuals; and with Fi consisting 
of real GDP per capita, the average years of total schooling and the investment share of GDP. We then 
extend Fi in three steps, in each step keeping the preceding additions. In step one, we add trust and the 
quality of the legal system; in step two, we add the Gini coefficient, government consumption as a 
share of GDP and two measures of political institutions (civil liberties and political rights); in step 
three we add country-group dummies for Asia, Latin America, transition countries, the EU and North 
America. Lastly, we perform a sensitivity test for our measure of human capital, by exchanging 
average years of total schooling with the gross enrollment rate and cognitive skills, respectively. This 
is warranted, since Glaeser (2005) finds that when human capital is controlled for, the effect of 
tolerance vanishes. One possible explanation is that as people obtain more education they also get 
more tolerant as a byproduct. Failing to correctly account for human capital in any study of the role of 
tolerance for economic growth could be severely misleading. Cogntive skills, obtained from Hanushek 
and Woessmann (2009), is a valuable complement to the other two measures, which can be criticized 
on at least two grounds: first, by pointing out that schooling is of varying quality between countries 
and second, by pointing out that learning outside of schools are not taken into account. Cognitive skills 
refer to average test scores in math and science in primary and secondary school. In defense of average 
years of schooling and similar measures we would like to point out that it captures the social aspects of 
schooling better than cognitive skills, a feature which may be especially relevant when tolerance, 
which is a social attitude, is studied. Results are reported in section 4.1. 
Second, we apply a robustness test focusing on outliers, i.e., observations that deviate from the 
linear pattern formed by the majority of the data (Rousseeuw and Leroy 1987). Outliers can occur for 
different reasons, e.g., measurement error, extraordinary but irrelevant events (such as disasters) or 
observations being drawn from a different population with a different relationship between the 
variables of interest. The latter is especially relevant in the cross-country context, when uncertainty 
about the specification of the empirical model is substantial. 
More specifically, we use the estimation technique least trimmed squares, which is “robust 
against the possibility that one or several unannounced outliers may occur anywhere in the data” 
(Hubert et al. 2004: 1515).
19 Following Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987), outliers are identified in the 
following way. A regression line is calculated by making use of the 75 percent of the observations that 
give the best fit (i.e., that minimize the sum of the squared residuals). The remaining 25 percent of the 
observations are then added, and residuals for all observations are computed. Countries with a 
                                                            
19 This technique was introduced by Rousseeuw (1984); see also Temple (1999), Zaman et al. (2001) and Sturm 
and de Haan (2005). 13 
 
standardized residual above approximately 2.5 are identified as outliers.
20 Thereafter, reweighted least 
squares is used for inference, in which countries identified as outliers are given the weight zero and the 
rest the weight one. The main advantage of least trimmed squares is that it, unlike simpler diagnostic 
methods, can handle cases with several jointly influential outliers. As we use the method with a 
breakdown point of 25 percent, it can handle cases where up to one fourth of the observations are 
jointly influential.
21 Results are reported in section 4.2. 
Third, we look at the issue of endogeneity by regressing our tolerance measures on average, 
annual economic growth during the preceding ten-year period. The idea is that if there is an effect of 
growth on tolerance, this should yield significant estimates for growth in these regressions. Results are 
reported in section 4.3.  
Fourth, we perform a fixed-effects panel-data analysis, using data from two ten-year growth 
periods, 1988–1997 and 1998–2007 with control variables measured in the beginning of each period 
(i.e. around 1988 and 1998 respectively). We estimate the following model: 
ΔYi,t = αi + γt + Xi,tΓ + Fi,tβ + ui,t,     (2) 
where ΔYi denotes the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita in country i in the period t to 
t+9, where αi is an intercept for country i, where γt captures average growth differences between the 
two time periods, where Xi,y is a row vector of tolerance measures for country i in year t and where Fi,t 
is a row vector of control variables for country i in year t. Here, we apply the full model used in the 
cross-sectional analysis. There are several advantages of a panel-data analysis (see, e.g., Hsiao, 2007), 
such as a reduced risk of omitted-variable bias, multicollinearity and endogeneity. Results are reported 
in section 4.4. 
 
                                                            
20 It should be noted that if the errors are normally distributed, then less than 1 percent of the observations should 
have a standardized residual above 2.5. Hence, if such cases are common, this suggests that the model is not 
suitable for all the countries in the sample.  
21 For more on the LTS estimator and its application, see Verboven and Hubert (2005) and Rousseeuw and Van 
Driessen (2006). 14 
 




Our variables can be divided into four groups: 
  The dependent variable: Growth: average annual growth in real GDP per capita. 
  Variables of interest: Tolerance homosexuals: share of the population that does not pick 
“homosexuals” in answer to the question: “On this list are various groups of people. Could 
you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?”; Tolerance race: share 
of the population that does not pick “people of a different race” in answer to the same 
question. 
  Control variables: Gdp: real GDP per capita; Schooling: average years of total schooling; 
Investment share: Total investment as percent of GDP in 1998; Trust: share of the population 
that answers in the affirmative to the question: “In general, do you think most people can be 
trusted or can’t you be too careful?”; Legal: quality of the legal system (area 2 of the 
Economic Freedom Index); Gini: the Gini coefficient, measuring income inequality; 
Government: government consumption as percent of GDP, measuring the size of government; 
Civil liberties: a composite measure of freedom of expression and belief, associational and 
organizational rights, rule of law and personal autonomy and individual rights; Political 
rights: a composite measure of electoral process, political pluralism and participation and 
functioning of government; Asia: a dummy taking the value 1 for Asian countries and 0 for 
other countries; Latin America: a dummy taking the value 1 for Latin American countries and 
0 for other countries; Transition: a dummy taking the value 1 for transition (i.e., former 
socialist) countries and 0 for other countries; EU: a dummy taking the value 1 for countries 
that are members of the European Union and 0 for other countries; North America: a dummy 
taking the value 1 for North American countries and 0 for other countries. 
  Alternative education measures: Enroll: gross enrollment rate in secondary education; 
Cognitive skills: average test scores in math and science in primary and secondary school. 
Let us comment a little more on this choice of variables. First, we believe that our tolerance 
measures are suitable in that they are based on actual social attitudes. The previous literature has used 
shares of inhabitants belonging to various minority groups as measures of tolerance, which seems to us 
far-fetched. For instance, one could have a large fraction of a certain group and still have intolerant 
attitudes toward it in the general population. Extreme but clarifying examples involve Jews in Nazi 
Germany and blacks under apartheid in South Africa; and Charles and Guryan (2008) show that the 
                                                            
22 The complete dataset is available on request. 15 
 
share of blacks in U.S. states is negatively related to black relative wages (if anything, indicating a link 
between population share and intolerance).  
Second, the control variables were chosen for two reasons: they have all been advanced as 
potential determinants of growth on theoretical grounds, and they have been linked to economic 
growth in several empirical studies (see section 2.1). With regard to theory, Gdp is included to capture 
a possible convergence effect; Investment is a measure of the change in physical capital; and 
Schooling is a measure of human capital. These are classic factors, all theoretically relevant for 
growth. As for the other control variables, Trust reduces transaction costs and enables smooth 
economic interaction without the need for costly contracting and monitoring, which could be expected 
to stimulate growth; Legal measures the extent to which transactions and investments are safe, which 
reasonably stimulates productive economic activity and growth; Gini measures income inequality, 
which is included since growth could be affected by socioeconomic cleavages; Government is a 
measure of government size, which is relevant to include since government expenditures affect both 
the abilities and incentives of people, but there is no consensus in the empirical literature about the 
sign of the effect; Civil liberties and Political rights are two further institutional variables, which could 
be relevant for growth: the first captures the degree to which citizens – including minorities – are 
treated equally in the legal-political sense, and the latter measures the quality of democracy, which can 
be expected to affect economic-political decision-making; the country-group dummies, lastly, are 
included as there may be systematic differences between regions that relate to region-specific 
characteristics not easily captured by the included control variables. This can be viewed as an attempt 
to approach a fixed-effects model in which country-specific effects are accounted for. 
Two time periods are used in this study: the cross-sectional regressions use 1998–2007 and the 
panel-data regression furthermore uses 1988–1997. We consider a ten-year period apt to capture 
growth effects. The explanatory variables are all measured in the beginning of each time period. 
Descriptive statistics, including definitions, sources and observation years, are found in Table 
A1 in the Appendix, and the sample can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix. Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 
illustrate tolerance levels around 1998, in the countries which we include in our cross-sectional 
regressions.  16 
 
Fig. 1     Shares of populations that are tolerant toward homosexuals (circa 1998) 
 





4   Results 
4.1   Cross-sectional results 
In Table 1, we report the estimates of regression model (1): it shows to what extent our two measures 
of tolerance are related to economic growth. We estimate four variations of this model, at each stage 
adding more control variables. 
Table 1     Cross-sectional regression results 
Dependent variable: Average annual growth in real GDP per capita 1998–2007   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Tolerance homosexuals  -3.652**  -4.551***  -3.955**  -3.037* 
  (1.696) (1.683) (1.624) (1.615) 
Tolerance  race  1.443 4.230 6.163  12.45*** 
  (3.465) (3.740) (4.102) (4.091) 
Gdp  -0.0661 -0.0466 -0.0497  -0.00464 
  (0.0505) (0.0708) (0.0670) (0.0514) 
Schooling 0.411***  0.388***  0.287*  0.0121 
  (0.129) (0.129) (0.149) (0.179) 
Investment  share  0.0622 0.0829* 0.0641 0.0895* 
  (0.0517) (0.0480) (0.0551) (0.0520) 
Trust   4.675*  4.195*  5.325** 
   (2.427)  (2.356)  (2.164) 
Legal   -0.387  -0.478  -0.418 
   (0.307)  (0.357)  (0.366) 
Gini     -0.0585**  0.0502 
     (0.0284)  (0.0433) 
Government     -0.00434  -0.0907** 
     (0.0406)  (0.0432) 
Political rights      -0.351  -0.239 
     (0.363)  (0.356) 
Civil liberties      0.326  0.347 
     (0.491)  (0.493) 
Asia      2.043 
      (1.372) 
Latin  America      -1.809* 
      (0.943) 
Transition      2.146*** 
      (0.785) 
EU      0.947 
      (0.614) 
North  America      0.0432 
      (0.810) 
Constant 0.112  -1.144  1.107  -8.187 
  (3.322) (3.653) (4.971) (5.565) 
Adj. R
2  0.264 0.333 0.350 0.478 
Observations  54 54 54 54 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 18 
 
Notably, in all regressions, we find evidence of a statistically significant, negative relationship 
between Tolerance homosexuals and Growth. This stands in stark contrast to the within-country 
literature cited above, which finds a positive effect of this kind of tolerance. Our point estimate 
indicates that an increase in the fraction of people who do not object to having homosexuals as 
neighbors by ten percentage points is associated with a 0.3–0.4 percentage-point growth reduction. 
The estimates of Tolerance race are positive throughout, but statistical significance is only achieved in 
the most extensive model with country-group dummies. The point estimate suggests a large effect: a 
ten percentage increase in this type of tolerance is related to a growth increase of 1.2 percentage 
points. However, one should interpret this with caution, both because of the lack of statistical 
significance and because the size of the estimate varies a great deal between the different 
specifications of the model.
23  
As for the control variables, Gdp is of the expected sign but does not attain statistical 
significance. Schooling also has the expected positive sign, as does Investment, but neither variable 
attains statistical significance in a consistent manner. As a sensitivity test, we have replaced Schooling 
in column (4) with Enroll and Cognitive, respectively, and the results are qualitatively unaltered.
24 The 
statistical significance, sizes and signs of our tolerance measures are not sensitive to which measure of 
human capital that is used. Trust is statistically significant and positively related to Growth 
throughout. Interestingly, the tolerance measures are not affected by its inclusion, suggesting an 
independent effect of tolerance not captured by trust. Legal has a negative sign, unlike what we 
expected, but it is not statistically significant. Gini and Government are statistically significant in one 
specification, respectively, each then with a negative sign. None of the two measures of political 
institutions are statistically significant; however, Latin America and Transition are, with a negative 
and positive sign, respectively.  
While adding more variables to the model reduces the risk of omitted-variable bias, it typically 
comes with the cost of reducing the power of the hypothesis tests, potentially causing problems with 
multicollinearity. Note, however, that we obtain statistical significance for both tolerance measures in 
the most extensive model, indicating that the addressing of omitted-variable bias has not critically 
reduced the power of our tests – quite the opposite.
25 Furthermore, we have calculated variance 
inflation factors for each variable in all specifications, and none of them exceeds 9, which indicates 
that there is no clear problem of multicollinearity.  
                                                            
23 The correlation between tolerance toward homosexuals and tolerance toward people of a different race is 0.51.  
24 In the case of Cognitive skills, the sample is 48 countries. 
25 If adding variables to the model effectively isolates exogenous variation in the variables of interest, the power 
of the test may increase, which seems to be the case here. 19 
 
We have also carried out a “missingness analysis” along the lines of Ríos-Figueroa and Staton 
(2008), to see whether there are significant differences in average Growth (our dependent variable) in 
1998–2007 between our sample (54 countries) and all other countries for which data are available (132 
additional countries). We find a difference of 0.9 percentage points: average Growth in our big sample 
was 3.4 percent and growth in the countries we do not include was 2.5 percent. The difference is 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This difference should be taken to indicate that 
countries not included in our analysis are systematically different from those that are included. As a 
consequence, one should be careful to generalize our results to the countries not included in the study. 
To summarize, our cross-sectional analysis indicates at this point that there is a relatively robust 
negative relationship between Tolerance homosexuals and Growth, while the positive relationship 
between Tolerance race and Growth is more uncertain in terms of statistical significance.  
 
4.2   Outlier analysis: least trimmed squares 
 
So far the analysis has proceeded on the implicit assumption that there are no outliers. To make sure 
this is the case, we use least trimmed squares to identify outliers and reweighted least squares to see 
what happens when such observations are removed. We eliminate countries in the descending order of 
their standardized residuals computed from the fitted values of the first-stage regression. Countries 
with a standardized residual greater than 2.5 are eliminated in this procedure (see section 3.1 for 
further details). Table 2 shows what happens when the three identified outliers are removed. The basis 
of the exercise is the model of column (4) in Table 1. 
Table 2     Point estimates for tolerance when outliers are removed 
Dependent variable: Average annual growth in real GDP per capita 1998 to 2007 
Tolerance homosexuals  -3.037*  -2.792**  -2.144*  -2.528** 
 (1.615)  (1.291)  (1.165)  (1.062) 
Tolerance race  12.45***  9.998**  8.940**  10.46*** 
 (4.091)  (3.676)  (3.474)  (3.327) 
Number of observations  54  53  52  51 









Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
All estimated equations include a constant term, both tolerance measures and the same six control variables as 
before as well as the country-group dummies (not reported here), i.e., the basis is column (4) of Table 1. Sources 
and variable definitions: see Table A1. Sample list: see Table A2. 20 
 
 
The removal of outliers changes little: the size of the estimates is reduced a little, but statistical 
significance is retained for both tolerance variables throughout. We conclude that the initial results are 
not sensitive to outliers: previous results remain when the outliers are removed and are broadly 
representative for the full sample. 
 
4.3   Endogeneity 
 
Our results should be interpreted with some caution and should only be seen as suggesting the 
possibility of a causal relationship. Partial correlations do not decisively settle the issue of whether 
tolerance causes growth or vice versa. As suggested by Friedman (2005) and Andersen and Fetner 
(2008), people in societies with a high GDP and economic growth tend to display more tolerance and 
generosity. In our view, there are two theoretical reasons why there may be a problem of reverse 
causality: it could be that attitudes like tolerance are affected by expectations of future growth, in turn 
determined by the previous growth record; and it could be that there is actual persistence in growth 
rates within countries. If this is the case, it seems plausible that a causal effect from growth to 
tolerance would be picked up by the estimated coefficient of growth in the preceding period.  
We have regressed our measures of tolerance on the growth rate 1988–1997, i.e. the preceding 
ten-year period. The results are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix. It turns out that we do not 
attain statistical significance for the growth variable, neither for Tolerance homosexuals nor for 
Tolerance race. Furthermore, the point estimates of growth are close to zero for both tolerance 
measures. When we remove outliers on the basis of a least trimmed squares analysis and re-estimate, 
nothing changes. This provides an indication that there is a tolerance–growth relationship, in that 
causal order.  
 
 
4.4   Panel-data analysis 
 
We also perform a fixed-effects panel-data analysis using data from two ten-year periods of growth. 
As noted in section 3.1, there are obvious advantages to using the panel-data approach, such as 
reduced problems with omitted-variable bias, multicollinearity and endogeneity. Data restrictions only 
enable us to carry out this analysis for 24 countries. Admittedly, this is a more limited sample, but we 
still consider the exercise useful, since panel data allows us to see whether a tolerance-growth 
relationship can be established when controlling for constant, country-specific influences on growth, 
such as institutional and historical factors of various kinds, that cannot easily be captured in the cross-
sectional regressions. In other words, we think there is a risk for omitted-variable bias which the 21 
 
panel-data analysis more convincingly takes care of.
26 In motivating the panel-data analysis, our 
reasoning goes along the lines of Gustavsson and Jordahl (2008: 353–354). They stress that if the 
point estimates of a fixed-effects panel-data analysis, using a smaller sample, have the same signs and 
sizes as in the cross sectional analysis, then this indicates that omitting fixed effects do not bias the 
point estimates of the cross-sectional analysis. 
We first report the cross-sectional results for the same 24 countries used in the panel-data 
analysis, and then the panel-data results themselves, in Table 3. 
We include the cross-sectional results in order to get an indication of whether the change to the 
smaller sample as such has an effect on the results. Here, we find that the signs and sizes of the 
tolerance variables are similar to the results for the larger sample, although in the small sample we do 
not get statistical significance. This is not surprising, since the sample is much smaller. When turning 
to the panel-data results, using two ten-year periods (1988–1997 and 1998–2007), we find that the 
signs and sizes of the tolerance variables remain the same, with statistical significance for the 
tolerance toward homosexuals variable.
 27  
As in section 4.1, we have undertaken a “missingness analysis”, to see whether there are 
significant differences in average Growth (our dependent variable) in 1998–2007 between our small 
panel-data sample (24 countries) and the 30 additional countries in our big cross-sectional sample. We 
find a difference of 0.5 percentage points (with the higher rate of 3.6 percent for the 30 additional 
countries), but this difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
This implies, in our view, a confirmation of the relative robust effect of tolerance toward 
homosexuals and the more shaky effect of tolerance toward people of a different race. It can be added 




26 One should bear in mind that time-varying growth determinants that are omitted from the analysis could still 
bias the estimates of the effect of tolerance on growth. 
27 Note that the panel approach and the cross-sectional analysis differ in the type of variation used to estimate the 
parameters and also in that data from a longer time period are used in the panel case. 
28 When we remove China and India, identified as outliers in section 4.2, the results for our two tolerance 
measures do not change qualitatively.  22 
 
Table 3     Panel-data regression results  
Dependent variable: Average annual growth in real GDP per capita 
 (1)  (2) 
Model   Cross-section  Panel fixed effects 
Tolerance homosexuals  -6.366  -3.629* 
 (4.220)  (2.063) 
Tolerance race  4.916  3.481 
 (7.951)  (4.647) 
Gdp -0.000155  -0.000516*** 
 (0.000162)  (0.000174) 
Schooling 0.200  0.657** 
 (0.373)  (0.275) 
Investment share  -0.0148  -0.108 
 (0.0569)  (0.0703) 
Trust 4.099  0.191 
 (3.293)  (1.989) 
Legal 0.0716  0.205 
 (0.561)  (0.273) 
Gini -0.0481  0.124** 
 (0.0357)  (0.0470) 
Government -0.0161  -0.0908 
 (0.0999)  (0.137) 
Political rights  0.425  -0.682* 
 (0.760)  (0.388) 
Civil liberties  0.390  0.496 
 (0.914)  (0.480) 
Time dummy    1.982** 
   (0.889) 
Asia -3.038   
 (5.834)   
Latin America  -3.391   
 (3.855)   
Transition -1.920   
 (4.118)   
EU -0.514   
 (1.714)   
North America  -0.979   
 (1.635)   
Constant 5.129  1.287 
 (5.054)  (5.865) 
Adj. R
2 0.521  0.864 
Time period  1998–2007  1988–2007 
Observations 24  48 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.23 
 
5   Concluding remarks 
 
Florida (2004: 17) claims the following: 
The same dynamics that fueled the movement of creative people between U.S. regions now 
operates on a global scale, and other nations are stepping up their ability to compete. 
Florida suggests that creative people are attracted to open, dynamic and tolerant environments and that 
such environments therefore are conducive to economic dynamism and growth. While there is some 
support for this suggestion on a local or regional basis, there is to our knowledge no empirical study to 
date which looks at the tolerance–growth relationship in a cross-country setting. This study is an 
attempt to fill that void. We propose several mechanisms that may cause tolerance to increase or 
decrease growth. We stress that different types of tolerance may have different effects on growth. In 
particular, we argue that there are stronger theoretical reasons for expecting tolerance toward 
homosexuals, compared to tolerance toward people of a different race, to have a negative effect on 
growth.  
We investigate, for the time period 1998–2007, whether tolerance toward homosexuals and 
toward people of another race, as measured by the share of people in different countries that indicate 
that they do not mind having neighbors that are homosexuals or of a different race, is related to growth 
in real GDP per capita. We analyze this issue by looking at a sample of maximally 54 countries, 
following the methodology of the empirical growth literature. 
Our main result is that tolerance toward homosexuals is negatively related to growth. Statistical 
significance is obtained throughout in a cross-sectional regression model which is varied in four 
different ways. When three identified outliers are removed, the result stands. And we verify the result 
in a panel-data analysis, which although conducted with a smaller sample indicates that fixed effects 
do not bias the cross-sectional estimates. As for tolerance toward people of a different race, for which 
we find a positive sign, the result is less robust. In the initial cross-sectional regressions, it only attains 
statistical significance in the most extensive model. That significance is retained when outliers are 
removed, but it does not appear in the panel-data analysis. In all, this makes us less certain about the 
relationship between tolerance toward people of a different race and economic growth.  
To get a feeling for the economic significance of our results, the point estimates suggest that an 
increase in tolerance toward homosexuals (people of a different race) by 10 percentage points is 
associated with a decrease in growth by 0.3–0.4 (an increase in growth by 1.0–1.2) percentage points. 
This is a non-negligible effect in both cases, although the effect for tolerance toward people of another 
race should be interpreted with caution due to absence of statistical significance in several regressions. 
If one moves from the average tolerance value to the maximum value, for tolerance toward 24 
 
homosexuals (toward people of another race) the growth rate decreases by 1.1 (increases by 1.4) 
percentage points. Again, this indicates substantial effects.  
Two caveats should be added. It is hard to establish causality, but we offer two preliminary 
indications of a direction from tolerance to growth and not the other way around. We regress tolerance 
on earlier growth, and do not find any statistically significant effect; and the panel-data analysis is 
more easily interpreted as causal (Finkel 1995). We should also stress that the results are applicable to 
the countries of our samples, and since they encompass at most 54 countries, one should be careful in 
generalizing the results to other parts of the world. We still think that the results are of value for 
clarifying the nature of the tolerance–growth relationships for the included countries. 
What to make of these results? Our overall interpretation is that just as growth is affected by 
other social factors, such as trust, it is also affected, in the typical country in our sample, by tolerance 
toward homosexuals. Hence, quite unlike the results of Richard Florida and his co-authors, the cross-
country evidence does not suggest that there is a general positive relationship between tolerance of 
homosexuals and growth: quite the opposite holds. This result should not be seen as normative: one 
may very well advocate tolerance toward homosexuals in spite of this finding, as there are other, and 
to many people more important, goals than growth. In any case, we also find some, although weaker, 
signs of a positive influence by tolerance toward people of a different race.  
We do not consider this study to be definitive in providing an answer to the role of tolerance for 
economic growth. Rather we view it as a first attempt to look into the economic effects of tolerance 
across countries. Extending the panel-data analysis as more data becomes available and trying to test 
empirically the various mechanisms that can explain the results, separately and jointly, are features on 
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Table A1     Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable  Description   Year(s)  Source  Obs  Mean  Std dev  Min  Max 
Tolerance 
homosexuals 
Share of the population that does not 
pick “homosexuals” in answer to the 
question “On this list are various 
groups of people. Could you please 
mention any that you would not like to 
have as neighbors?” 
1998  World Values Survey  
(Inglehart et al. 2004) 
54  0.59 0.23 0.02 0.94 
Tolerance 
race 
Share of the population that does not 
pick “people of a different race” in 
answer to the question “On this list are 
various groups of people. Could you 
please mention any that you would not 
like to have as neighbors?” 
1998 54  0.87  0.083  0.64  0.98 
Growth  (((Gdp 2007/Gdp 1997)^0.1)-1)*100  1997–2007  Penn World Tables 6.3  
(Heston et al. 2009) 
 
54  3.38 1.97 0.58 9.75 
Gdp  Real GDP per capita (chain series), 
2000 constant prices (thousands of 
USD)  
1998  54  16.2 11.8 0.65 55.2 
Investment 
share 
Total investment as percent of GDP, 
constant prices  
1998  54  25.2 7.01 10.2 37.7 
Schooling  Average years of total schooling  1998  Barro and Lee (2010), www.barrolee.com  54  8.93  2.06  3.88  13.0 
Trust  Share of the population agreeing with 
the statement “most people can be 
trusted” rather than with the alternative 
“you need to be very careful in dealing 
with people”.  
1998  World Values Survey  
(Inglehart et al. 2004) 
54  0.29 0.15 0.03 0.67 
Legal  Area 2 of the Economic Freedom 
Index: Legal structure and security of 
property rights (measured from 1 to 10, 
where 1 is the lowest and 10 is the 
highest degree) 
2000  Gwartney and Lawson (2008), 
www.freetheworld.com 
54  6.78 1.86 3.40 9.62 32 
 




World Income Inequality Database V2.0c 
May 2008, World Institute for 
Development Economics Research, United 
Nations University, www.wider.unu.edu 
54  36.1 10.1 22.3 60.4 
Government  General government final consumption 
as percent of Gdp 
1998  World Development Indicators database, 
the World Bank, www.worldbank.org  
54  17.1 5.58 4.40 27.3 
Political 
rights 
Political rights (measured from 1 to 7, 
where 7 is the lowest and 1 is the 
highest degree)  
1998–1999  Freedom House database, 
www.freedomhouse.org 
54 2.06  1.53  1  7 
Civil liberties  Civil liberties (measured from 1 to 7, 
where 7 is the lowest and 1 is the 
highest degree)  
1998–1999 54  2.44  1.34  1  6 
Enroll   Average enrollment rate in secondary 
education for the years with available 
data between 1996 and 2000, percent 
of population in theoretical age for 
secondary education 
1996–2000  Education database, the World Bank, 
www.worldbank.org  
54 90.3  27.0  5.92 155.3 
Cognitive 
skills 
Average of all test scores in math and 
science, primary through end of 
secondary school, for three age groups: 
ages 9–10, ages 13–15 and those in the 
final year of secondary education, from 
three periods of time (1964–1972, 
1982–1991 and 1995-2003, scaled to 
PISA scale divided by 100)  
1964–2003  Hanushek and Woessmann (2009)  48  4.59  0.58  3.09  5.19 
Asia  Dummy for Asian countries  
(China, India, Indonesia, Philippines) 
1998 -  54  0.09  -  0  1 
Latin America  Dummy for Latin American countries  1998  Bjørnskov (2008)  54  0.17  -  0  1 
Transition  Dummy for transition countries  1998  Freedom in the World Historical Rankings 
database, www.freedomhouse.org 
54 0.26  -  0  1 
EU  Dummy for EU countries  2007  www.europa.eu 54 0.46  -  0  1 
North 
America 
Dummy for North American countries 
(Canada, Mexico, United States) 
1998 - 54 0.06  -  0  1 
Notes: In certain cases, values are from adjacent years, when data were missing for our particular year of interest.  33 
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Table A3     Cross-sectional regression results: testing for endogeneity 
Dependent variable: Tolerance homosexuals and Tolerance race respectively   
  Homosexuals Race Homosexuals Race 
Growth 1988–1997  0.00424  0.000659  0.000772  0.00262 
 (0.0132)  (0.00407)  (0.00894)  (0.00279) 
Gdp 0.00394  0.00101  0.00599**  0.00218** 
 (0.00293)  (0.000881)  (0.00247)  (0.000902) 
Schooling 0.0400**  0.0149***  0.0590***  0.0103** 
  (0.0155) (0.00456) (0.0113) (0.00414) 
Investment share  -0.000731  -0.000968  -0.0121***  -0.00108 
  (0.00499) (0.00165) (0.00382) (0.00121) 
Trust  0.273* -0.0760 0.247* 0.0576 
 (0.161)  (0.0639)  (0.129)  (0.0541) 
Legal  -0.0656 0.00663 -0.0228 0.00415 
  (0.0447) (0.0104) (0.0235)  (0.00775) 
Gini -0.00146  -0.000103  -0.00430  -0.001000 
  (0.00378) (0.00110) (0.00265)  (0.000948) 
Government 0.00673  0.00736***  0.00922**  0.00678*** 
  (0.00563) (0.00194) (0.00353) (0.00121) 
Political rights  -0.0249  0.0160  -0.0611***  -0.00320 
  (0.0227) (0.0118) (0.0199)  (0.00721) 
Civil liberties  -0.0553  -0.00907  0.0445  0.0312*** 
  (0.0448) (0.0231) (0.0311) (0.0112) 
Asia -0.0609  -0.126***  0.196**  -0.214*** 
 (0.153)  (0.0449)  (0.0811)  (0.0275) 
Latin America  0.0602  0.0326  0.307***  0.0406 
 (0.117)  (0.0410)  (0.0689)  (0.0252) 
Transition  -0.299*** -0.0251 -0.271*** -0.0191 
  (0.0972) (0.0336) (0.0688) (0.0252) 
EU 0.0708  -0.0440*  0.157***  -0.0715*** 
  (0.0578) (0.0259) (0.0460) (0.0163) 
North America  -0.0105  -0.0590*  0.0165  -0.0267 
  (0.0639) (0.0341) (0.0595) (0.0278) 
Constant  0.722 0.631*** 0.299 0.637*** 
  (0.459) (0.104) (0.250)  (0.0815) 
Adj. R
2  0.628 0.653 0.849 0.857 
Observations  49 49 43 43 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. For four countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Russia and Slovenia) 
growth rates refer to 1990–1997. In column 3 and 4, six outliers identified with LTS have been removed. 
  